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Abstract In the last decades increasing attention is paid to the topic of respon-
sibility in technology development and engineering. The discussion of this topic is
often guided by questions related to liability and blameworthiness. Recent discus-
sions in engineering ethics call for a reconsideration of the traditional quest for
responsibility. Rather than on alleged wrongdoing and blaming, the focus should
shift to more socially responsible engineering, some authors argue. The present
paper aims at exploring the different approaches to responsibility in order to see
which one is most appropriate to apply to engineering and technology development.
Using the example of the development of a new sewage water treatment technology,
the paper shows how different approaches for ascribing responsibilities have dif-
ferent implications for engineering practice in general, and R&D or technological
design in particular. It was found that there was a tension between the demands that
follow from these different approaches, most notably between efﬁcacy and fairness.
Although the consequentialist approach with its efﬁcacy criterion turned out to be
most powerful, it was also shown that the fairness of responsibility ascriptions
should somehow be taken into account. It is proposed to look for alternative, more
procedural ways to approach the fairness of responsibility ascriptions.
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In the last decades increasing attention is paid to the topic of responsibility in
technology development and engineering.
1 The topic is often raised in the context of
disasters due to technological failure, such as the Bhopal disaster (Castleman and
Purkavastha 1985; Bisarya and Puri 2005), the explosion of the Challenger
(Vaughan 1996; Davis 1998; Harris et al. 2005), and the sinking of the Herald of
Free Enterprise (Richardson and Curwen 1995; Berry 2006). The discussion of
responsibility then typically focuses on questions related to liability and
blameworthiness.
2 Asking these questions might suggest that there is one,
unambiguous deﬁnition of responsibility. This is far from true, however. In moral
philosophy, few concepts are more slippery than that of responsibility (Miller 2001,
p. 455). What the questions of liability and blameworthiness share, is that the
question of responsibility is asked after some undesirable event has occurred.
However, the ascription of responsibility can also refer to something that ought to
happen in the future: being responsible then means that an agent has been assigned a
certain task or set of obligations to see to it that a certain state of affairs is brought
about (or prevented). In that latter case, responsibility is often ascribed from a
consequentialist perspective.
3 As a third approach one could also distinguish the
question of responsibility from the perspective of the rights of potential victims,
which often focuses on the question who should put a situation right (e.g., by
compensating for certain damage).
Recent discussions in engineering ethics call for a reconsideration of the
traditional quest for responsibility. Rather than on alleged wrongdoing and blaming,
the focus should shift to more socially responsible engineering, in which ‘‘to
maximize the service to the larger society’’ should become the ethical norm (Durbin
2008, p. 230). Responsibility as blameworthiness should therefore be replaced by, or
complemented with the notion of engineering as a responsible practice (Pritchard
2001). Until the late 1990s, scholarly literature on engineering ethics, however,
seemed to be biased towards the blame-oriented or merit-based perspective on
responsibility rather than this more forward-looking perspective (Pritchard 2001,
p. 391; Durbin 1997).
1 In the present paper I will only discuss the ethical aspects of moral responsibility. The metaphysics of
moral responsibility, which is closely related to the free will debate, is outside the scope of the present
paper. The reader is referred to the vast array of literature on this topic (e.g., Berofsky 1966; Frankfurt
1971; Wolf 1981; Watson 1982; Dennett 1984; O’Connor 1995; Kane 2002; Widerker and McKenna
2002; Pink 2004).
2 A good example is the discussion of the case study ‘‘The West Gate Bridge: Who was Responsible?’’ in
the engineering section of the recent anthology on professional ethics (Allhoff and Vaidya 2009). Also
Swierstra and Jelsma (2006) ask the question ‘‘to what extent engineers can be held responsible in normal
practice’’ (p. 309).
3 One could also distinguish a virtue ethics approach to responsibility, which is forward-looking as well.
In the remainder of the text I focus on the consequentialist perspective in general, since the virtue ethics
approach is primarily aimed at relations between people. This does not imply that there are no leads to
apply this approach to the ﬁeld of technology development and engineering, but until now this has hardly
been done. The elaboration of this relatively novel approach falls outside the scope of the present paper.
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123Similarly, both in the general ﬁeld of moral philosophy, and more speciﬁcally in
the ﬁeld of engineering ethics, there has also been a call to shift the focus of ethics
from an abstract outsider’s perspective towards the practice in which moral
deliberation takes place. For example, in the general ﬁeld of moral philosophy
Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Walzer argue for an insider’s perspective when
trying to improve a practice.
4 In the ﬁeld of engineering ethics, philosophers such as
Michael Pritchard, Mike Martin, Vivian Weil and Michael Davis are ﬁrm
proponents of taking an insider’s perspective on engineering and its ethical issues.
Michael Davis, for instance argues that the discussion of responsibility is too much
about ‘holding others responsible’ instead of ‘assuming responsibility’ (Davis
2009).
This shift from an outsider’s perspective towards an insider’s perspective might
have implications for the topic of responsibility as well. The present paper aims at
exploring three main approaches to responsibility in order to see which one is most
appropriate to apply in engineering and technology development, where I take
appropriateness to mean two things:
(1) the approach should reﬂect people’s basic intuitions of when it is justiﬁed to
ascribe responsibility to someone. An approach that contravenes these basic
intuitions will probably be deemed unfair. Whether such an approach should
depart from abstract principles and work top-down to considered judgments
about particular cases, or depart from these considered judgments and work
bottom-up to more general principles is still open for discussion. It is
important, though, that people recognize that the responsibility ascription is
justiﬁed.
(2) the approach should inform the direction of technology development and
therewith improve technological design. In order for this to be so, it should be
possible to apply the approach to speciﬁc contextualized moral issues that are
raised by speciﬁc technological and scientiﬁc developments rather than to
more general abstract issues. This second requirement follows from recent
discussions within engineering ethics, and ethics concerning New and
Emerging Science and Technology (NEST) in particular, in which it is argued
that the ethical and social aspects of new technologies should be addressed at
an early stage of technology development in order to adapt technology to
society’s needs (Van de Poel 2008; Swierstra and Rip 2007).
5
The outline of this paper is as follows. I will ﬁrst discuss three different
perspectives for ascribing responsibility: a merit-based perspective, a rights-based
4 Michael Walzer argues that only a passionately committed ‘‘connected critic’’ can effectively challenge
a prevailing culture. Such a critic can only be effective because he is committed and involved (Walzer
1987, 2002). Alasdair MacIntyre questions the distinction between theory and practice. These are
thoroughly intertwined, and as such, the search for the good life always develops on the basis of the
embeddedness in a particular practice. By participating in a practice, people form their opinions of what
the good life amounts to. Moral deliberation should therefore not be separated from the practice itself
(MacIntyre 1984).
5 Cf. the contributions in the special issue on Ethics and Engineering Design in Science, Technology and
Human Values (May 2006 issue), edited by Van de Poel and Verbeek (2006).
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123perspective and a consequentialist perspective. After a brief intermezzo on forward-
looking and backward-looking responsibilities, I will apply the three perspectives
to the example of the development of a new sewage water treatment technology.
A comparison of the three approaches will show that the consequentialist
perspective is especially suited for distributing responsibilities since it is most
akin to the engineering work and it (therefore) offers the best opportunities for
improving technological design. The paper ends with recommendations for further
developing the ﬁeld of engineering ethics by incorporating insights from political
philosophy.
Three Perspectives for Ascribing Responsibility
In this section, I discuss three approaches or perspectives for ascribing responsi-
bility: a merit-based perspective, a rights-based perspective and a consequentialist
perspective.
6 Although the latter is common in non-philosophical discussions (for
example in organizational and management literature), the philosophical literature is
mainly focused on responsibility as blameworthiness (i.e., the merit-based
perspective).
7 Being the most common approach in philosophical literature, I start
the present overview with this merit-based perspective.
A Merit-Based Perspective on Responsibility
In the philosophical literature on moral responsibility, the aim for ascribing
responsibility is mostly retributivist. In the traditional view, being morally
responsible means that the person is an appropriate candidate for reactive attitudes,
such as blame or praise (Strawson 1974; Fischer and Ravizza 1993; Miller 2004).
Being morally responsible (i.e., being eligible for reactions of praise and blame) is
not the same as being causally responsible. One can imagine a situation where a
person did indeed causally contribute to certain outcome but is not eligible for moral
evaluation, and hence not for reactive attitudes of praise or blame (e.g., in case of
positive outcomes due to sheer luck, or negative outcomes which one could not
reasonably avoid). In both cases it is not warranted to praise or blame the person for
the outcome. Hence, since moral responsibility in this above elaborated view is
related to reactive attitudes, which may have consequences for the well-being of an
agent, the ascription of moral responsibility is only warranted if these reactive
attitudes and their consequences are merited or deserved (see Zimmerman 1988;
Wallace 1994; Watson 1996; Magill 2000; Eshleman 2008). This is usually
translated into certain conditions that have to be met before it is fair to ascribe
responsibility to someone. In the remainder, I call this the fairness criterion of
6 The way the three approaches are presented here might suggest that, when talking about responsibility,
people apply either one of the three approaches. In reality hybrid approaches exist as well. However, as an
analytical concept it seems useful to separate the three approaches since they each serve a different
purpose and as such they are distinct.
7 A few exceptions are Goodin (1995), Van den Hoven (1998), Young (2006), Nihle ´n Fahlquist (2006b,
2009).
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the following conditions together capture the general notion of when it is fair to hold
an agent morally responsible for (the consequences of) their actions (see Feinberg
1970; Hart and Honore ´ 1985; Bovens 1998; Fischer and Ravizza 1998; Corlett
2006):
1. Moral agency: the responsible actor is an intentional agent concerning the
action. This means that the agent must have adequate possession of his or her
mental faculties at the moment of engaging in the action. Young children and
people whose mental faculties are permanently or temporarily disturbed will
not be (fully) held responsible for their behavior. However, to put oneself
knowingly and voluntarily into a situation of limited mental capacity (by
drinking alcohol or taking drugs for example) does not (in general) exempt one
from being responsible for the consequences of one’s behavior. Some people
phrase this condition in terms of intention, meaning that the action was guided
by certain desires or beliefs.
2. Voluntariness or freedom: the action resulting in the outcome was voluntary,
which means that the actor is not responsible for actions done under
compulsion, external pressure or hindered by other circumstances outside the
actor’s control. The person must be in the position to determine his own course
of action (cf. condition 1), and to act according to that.
3. Knowledge of the consequences: the actor knew, or could have known, the
outcome. Ignorance due to negligence, however, does exempt one from
responsibility.
4. Causality: the action of the actor contributed causally to the outcome; in other
words, there has to be a causal connection between the agent’s action or
inaction and the damage done.
5. Transgression of a norm: the causally contributory action was faulty, which
means that the actor in some way contravened a norm.
Note that especially the ﬁrst two conditions are closely interrelated. Being an
intentional agent means that one has the opportunity of putting the will into effect
and that one is free from external pressure or compulsion (Thompson 1980; Lewis
1991; May and Hoffman 1991). With regard to the ﬁfth condition, extensive debate
has been going on as to what counts as a norm. In daily life the norm can be much
vaguer than in criminal law where the norm must be explicitly formulated
beforehand (the nullum crimen, nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali principle).
8
A Rights-Based Perspective on Responsibility: The No Harm Principle
A second approach for ascribing responsibilities within the ﬁeld of science and
technology is based on the individual right of people to be safeguarded from the
consequences of another person’s actions (the so-called no harm principle). This
implies that ‘‘actions are right if and only if: either there are no (possible)
consequences for others; or those who will experience the (possible) consequences
8 The literal translation of this principle reads ‘‘no crime, no punishment without a previous penal law.’’
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consequences’’ (Zandvoort 2005b, p. 46). The aim of this approach is remedial: it
refers to the duty or obligation to put a situation right (Miller 2004). In practice this
rights-based approach translates into two requirements for decision making
regarding the development, production and use of technology (Zandvoort 2008).
The ﬁrst is the (legal) requirement of strict liability, which holds that actors are
unconditionally required to repair or fully compensate for any damage to others that
may result from their actions, regardless of culpability or fault (Honore ´ 1999; Van
Velsen 2000; Vedder 2001; Zandvoort 2005a). Hence, the question of responsibility
is reduced to the question ‘who caused the particular outcome’ (causal responsi-
bility). As such, blame is not the guiding concept in ascribing responsibility.
9 The
second requirement relates to the principle of informed consent, which holds that
‘‘for all activities that create risks for others, all who are subjected to the risks must
have given their informed consent to the activities and the conditions under which
the activities are performed’’ (Zandvoort 2008, p. 4).
Instead of fairness towards potential wrongdoers, this approach focuses on
fairness towards potential victims. Given the importance of informed consent, the
engineering ethics literature on this approach to responsibility therefore focuses on
the conditions under which consent can be gained and its implications for, e.g., risk
communication and risk assessment.
A Consequentialist Perspective on Responsibility
The third perspective for ascribing responsibility is the consequentialist perspective.
In the consequentialist perspective, responsibility is ascribed for instrumental
reasons rather than retributivist (merit-based) or remedial (rights-based) reasons. In
the consequentialist perspective, the most important question when ascribing
responsibility is not whether the reactive response triggered by the responsibility
ascription is warranted but whether the reactive response would likely lead to a
desired outcome, such as improved behavior by the agent (Eshleman 2008).
10
Where fairness is the main criterion for the merit-based perspective and informed
consent the basis for the rights-based approach, efﬁcacy is the criterion for
consequentialist responsibility ascriptions, which means that they should contribute
to the solution of the problem at hand (Nihle ´n Fahlquist 2006a, 2009). According to
a strict consequentialist view, the responsibility ascription that yields the best
consequences is the morally optimal responsibility ascription. Responsibilities, in
this view, do not take speciﬁc actions of persons as their object but they rather have
the character of obligations to see to it that a certain state of affairs is brought about
9 This does not necessarily hold for all versions of liability. The principle of fault liability holds that an
offender can only be held liable in case of culpably careless or faulty behavior (Zweigert and Ko ¨tz
1998[1977]).
10 Note that this consequentialist perspective does not imply that one necessarily promotes some
(material) utility function. Kutz, e.g., defends an instrumental (or functionalist, as he calls it) conception
of responsibility without claiming that practices of accountability are aimed at optimizing aggregates
states of social welfare. Accountability, in Kutz’ view, serves to sustain relationships among discrete
individuals (Kutz 2000, p. 54).
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Hoven 1998, p. 107).
In the case of engineering and technology development, this consequentialist
perspective could be taken to imply that for a technology to be ‘‘right,’’ in the sense
that it is from a societal point of view desirable or at least acceptable that the
technology is being developed, potential implications for society (e.g., human health
and the environment) should be taken into account during the design phase. In other
words, for every potential implication, whether this is a risk or some other
problematic issue, someone should be ascribed the responsibility to address this
issue. This does not mean that all risks should be completely excluded—a
requirement which is impossible to live up to—but that at least everything that can
reasonably be known should be considered during design and development phase.
Sometimes this might imply that, after deliberation, a potential risk will be accepted
as is since the (societal) costs of preventing it do not outweigh the (societal) costs of
accepting it.
11
The Three Perspectives Compared
In the overview presented above, a distinction was made between the goals that
were aimed at in the different perspectives. In addition to a different aim, we could
also say that the three approaches each depart from a particular moral background
theory and that they each try to answer a different moral question.
12 The merit-
based approach ﬁts into a deontological framework, which is primarily a theory of
‘‘right actions.’’ The rights-based approach ﬁts into an ethics of rights and freedoms
(see, e.g., Nozick 1974; Mackie 1978). This theory shares with deontological ethics
that it takes ‘‘action’’ as the primary object of evaluation. Where deontological
ethics departs from duties, a right-based discourse departs from people’s individual
rights and freedom and uses these to determine which actions are permissible and
which are not. In both cases the content of the responsibility ascription is action that
ought to be abstained from (merit-based) or that ought to be done (rights-based): to
breach a duty is to perform a blameworthy action (merit-based) or to be liable for
compensation (rights-based).
The consequentialist approach, which (unsurprisingly) ﬁts best into some form of
consequentialism, has a different focus. Rather than on particular action, the
consequentialist approach is focused on states of affairs. It does not prescribe what
action ought to be done but rather what should be achieved.
A summary of the three approaches is listed in Table 1.
11 For the moment I leave it open how to determine ‘‘what can reasonably be known.’’ For the remainder
of the argument, it is not required to exactly deﬁne it. A good starting point might be the state of
knowledge of peers in one’s ﬁeld.
12 Similar to what was said in footnote 6, this classiﬁcation is meant for analytical clariﬁcation and as
such it shows a somewhat simpliﬁed picture of the ‘‘ethical landscape.’’ The use of a merit-based
perspective is not applied exclusively by deontologists, neither is it impossible to think of consequences
in a deontological or rights-based discourse. This classiﬁcation does describe the moral theory most akin
to a certain responsibility perspective.
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Before continuing the application of the three perspectives on a real engineering
case, some clariﬁcations regarding responsibility need to be made.
One could argue that the merit-based and the consequentialist perspective
responsibility are not comparable in the sense that they refer to different time
horizons. We therefore cannot speak of two perspectives on the same concept but
we rather should speak of two different types of responsibility, each with a
different criterion. For example, the merit-based perspective is often applied after-
the-fact and it is therefore backward-looking or retrospective. The consequentialist
perspective is often applied in a forward-looking or prospective sense (i.e., before
something has happened). However, despite the difference in focus, the two
perspectives are closely related. Imagine an engineer E who designs some artifact
A. Unfortunately, there is a serious ﬂaw in the design and the artifact causes the
death of some innocent person P. Imagine further that E could have easily
designed an artifact A* with similar (functional) characteristics but without the
property leading to the death of P. In fact, E knew that the design was ﬂawed and
he intentionally did not improve the design, even though he had the freedom to do
so. From this we would probably conclude that E is morally responsible for the
death of P. But why is that so? As explained in the section ‘‘A Merit-Based
Perspective on Responsibility,’’ this perspective involves a moral assessment of
the agent in terms of the conditions discussed above. Except for the condition of
causation, which determines whether someone did causally contribute to a certain
outcome, the other four conditions bridge the gap between causal and moral
responsibility. In the example, four conditions are obviously met: the engineer is a
moral agent (condition 1), he was free (2), he knew of the consequences (3) and
he causally contributed to the death (4). But what about the ﬁfth condition: the
transgression of a norm? Most people would probably say that E is blameworthy
because he did not pay enough attention to the lethal consequences of the artifact.
Apparently, the ﬁfth condition in the merit-based perspective implies a forward-
looking responsibility to be careful or to pay attention. Both in law and
professional ethics this forward-looking responsibility is operationalized in the
duty of (reasonable) care to avoid (foreseeable) harm to others. At the minimal
level, this duty of care implies that E should consider how to redirect foreseeable
harm to people who are affected by his artifact, but it could also be argued that he
has the (broader) responsibility to look after potentially dangerous but as yet
Table 1 Perspectives for ascribing responsibility
Perspective Ethical theory Aim Criterion Content
Merit-based Deontological ethics Retributivist Fairness Actions
Rights-based Ethics of rights and freedoms Remedial Informed consent Actions
Consequentialist Consequentialism Instrumental Efﬁcacy States of affairs
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that should be avoided. In this simpliﬁed case, the duty of care requires that the
engineer should not develop artifact A but rather A*. So also in a merit-based
perspective, people have forward-looking responsibilities.
If we depart from the consequentialist view, we also see that the forward-
looking and backward-looking responsibilities are closely related. It is because
blame and praise can have a motivational force to take up one’s forward-looking
responsibility that backward-looking responsibilities are being ascribed. Hence,
forward-looking responsibilities translate into backward-looking responsibilities
and vice versa.
Development of a New Sewage Treatment Technology:
The Three Perspectives Applied
Now we have clariﬁed the different approaches to ascribing responsibility, we can
apply these to the ﬁeld of technology development. I do so on the basis of an
embedded ethical research that was carried out parallel to the technical
development of a new sewage treatment technology (Zwart et al. 2006; Van de
Poel and Zwart forthcoming). The idea behind this so-called embedded ethical
research or ethical parallel research is that ethical investigations are carried out
parallel to, and in close cooperation with, a speciﬁc technological R&D project.
The ethicists interact with the technological researchers, allowing the ethicists to
co-shape new technological developments. By applying the three responsibility
perspectives (merit-based, rights-based, and consequentialist) to technology
development, I explore the appropriateness of the different perspectives in
engineering practice in terms of the two criteria formulated in the introduction of
this paper.
Ethical Parallel Research Into The Upscaling Of The GSBR Technology
The ethical parallel research concerned the development of a new sewage
treatment technology, the so-called granular sludge sequencing batch reactor
(GSBR) (see Text box below for a description of the technology). In the
technological project, different parties contributed, classiﬁed by the ethical parallel
researchers according to their role in the project team. These were the role of
researcher, technology producer (including activities like design and consultancy),
user of the technology, and ﬁnancer of the technology. The ethical parallel
research consisted of a qualitative research, based on interviews, document
analysis, attendance of technical meetings and the organization of an interactive
session in the Group Decision Room (GDR; an electronic brainstorming facility)
with the different stakeholders, where questions related to risks and responsibil-
ities were addressed.
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de Poel and Zwart forthcoming)
One drawback of traditional biological wastewater treatment plants is their large space demand or
footprint, which is caused by the use of separate settling tanks and the slow settling velocity of the
sludge. In the aerobic GSBR technology both size increasing factors are addressed. By using high-
density granules, the time needed for the sludge to sink to the bottom at the end of each cycle is
substantially reduced. Subsequently, the shorter deposit time increases the throughput of the installation
and reduces the footprint. Second, it is hoped that different ecological zones inside the granules will be
able to take care for the entire treatment process in one reactor instead of several separate tanks
The GSBR technology has been developed at the Department of Biotechnology, Delft University of
Technology, the Netherlands. After successful laboratory experiments, the Dutch Foundation for
Applied Water Research (STOWA) was found willing to invest in the scaling-up of the three-liter
laboratory reactor to an outdoor pilot plant of 1.5 m
3. In parallel to the upscaling of the pilot plant,
funds were acquired for a PhD-project (funding organization: Technology Foundation STW). Finally,
an international engineering and consulting ﬁrm, with water management technology as one of its main
domains, showed interest in the commercial exploration of the GSBR technology. This ﬁrm was in
charge of the research at the pilot plant, operated by a local water board. The results of the pilot plant
have been positive and the ﬁrm anticipates a large demand for GSBRs
One of the crucial elements in the development of the technology was the
upscaling of the three-liter laboratory reactor to an outdoor pilot plant of 1.5 m
3.
This upscaling was partly based on several unproven assumptions about which
microbiological mechanisms are at work. The ethical parallel research, therefore,
focused on the question of how this incompleteness of knowledge was dealt with in
the choice of scaling-up steps. Incomplete knowledge can lead to the introduction of
certain risks, which may become manifest in the research done during the
development of the technology, but also later in the eventual use of this technology.
The aim of the ethical parallel research was to ﬁnd out how risks and uncertainties
are handled and how this is open to improvement.
During the ethical parallel research, it was observed that the risks due to so-called
secondary emissions (i.e., unwanted but not yet regulated substances in the efﬂuent)
were not addressed by any of the engineers and researchers involved. The users of
the technology delegated the risk of secondary emissions to the research phase, for
which they were not primarily responsible, and most of the researchers allocated the
risk to a phase for which they in turn bore no responsibility. Nobody therefore
assumed responsibility for dealing with this risk. The argument put forward by the
researchers and users was that the impact of the risks due to these secondary
emissions was negligible and that problems were expected to be solvable in the next
phase of the research. This was based on the presumed similarity between biological
processes in traditional sewage plants and the biological processes in the GSBR
technology. As a result, the issue who is responsible for checking or preventing
secondary emissions never became an object of discussion. The ethical parallel
researchers state that it cannot be concluded that ‘‘such emissions are a serious cause
of concern; the situation is rather one of insufﬁcient knowledge. Thus the question
arises which of the actors in the network are responsible for reducing this
knowledge deﬁciency, and which actors are responsible for reducing potential
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Zwart forthcoming). As a result of the ethical parallel research, the consultancy ﬁrm
together with the university applied for additional funding to carry out research into
the secondary emissions.
In the remainder of this section, I try to show how the different responsibility
approaches can be applied to the development of this new technology and how these
affect engineering practice, focusing on the issue of secondary emissions.
A Merit-Based Perspective on Harm Caused by the GSBR Technology
The ﬁrst approach I discuss is the merit-based perspective on responsibility. In the
section ‘‘Forward-Looking Versus Backward-Looking responsibility,’’ it was shown
that, although focused on blame, the merit-based perspective implies the ascription
of forward-looking responsibilities as well. It was argued that these forward-looking
responsibilities are primarily derived from the duty of (reasonable) care. This means
that people should take measures against foreseeable harm and possibly also look
after as yet unforeseen harms. It is notoriously difﬁcult to assess what ‘‘reasonable
care’’ exactly amounts to in technology development, especially in the case of new
and emerging technologies where the consequences are even harder to predict.
A possible starting point for the evaluation of due care is the test of independent
peers. If peers think that some negative consequences were foreseeable, we could
probably conclude that the engineer(s) did not exercise due care.
Let us assume that the GSBR technology is being further developed and
commercially exploited. Now suppose that secondary emissions, contrary to
expectations, cause some problems for farmers who have their surface water treated
with the GSBR technology. Can we point to some person or institution as being
morally responsible for these problems? The ethical parallel researchers asked the
developers of the technology whom they would ascribe moral responsibility for the
secondary emissions to (in the sense of preventing or investigating the harmful
effects). They did not get a unanimous answer: some ascribed the responsibility to
the researchers at laboratory scale, some to the operators of the pilot plant and some
to the users of the technology. Some even argued that no-one carries moral
responsibility for these harmful consequences because ‘‘introduction of new
technology introduces risks and we have to learn to live with that’’ (ibid.). The latter
answer suggests that the principle of due care was not breached at all. However, the
fact that some researchers from adjacent scientiﬁc ﬁelds did express their concerns
about the technology (ibid., pp. 20–21) suggests the opposite. Apparently, before
involvement of the ethical parallel researchers there was not enough incentive to
take up the forward-looking responsibility to further investigate the potential risks
of these secondary emissions, even though the researchers were aware of the lack of
knowledge regarding these emissions. As such we could say that the duty of
(reasonable) care was not fully exercised.
If we discuss moral responsibility in terms of the traditional criteria, probably
no-one can be held morally responsible. Although the different actors all
contributed to the development of the technology, we can not single out one
particular actor or institution that individually carried out all necessary contributions
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were fulﬁlled, probably none of the actors or institutions within the research group
fulﬁlled all the responsibility criteria individually. Especially the knowledge
condition, requiring that one can only be held responsible if one knew or could have
known the negative consequences, is a problematic condition in this case. Since
none of the actors took up the responsibility to reduce the knowledge deﬁciency
regarding the secondary emissions, which would show that the secondary emissions
are not as harmless as the technology developers thought they were, no further
preventive measures were taken to reduce the risks. However, it is not clear who
should have taken up this responsibility. The responsibility for this knowledge
deﬁciency probably lies with the researchers, whereas the causal responsibility lies
with the technology producers and users. Hence, if we apply the ﬁve conditions of
the merit-based approach, nobody can be held responsible for the negative
consequences (i.e., the secondary emissions) of the technology, even though the
research team as a whole breached the duty of (reasonable) care.
13 In the literature
this is called the problem of many hands, which is ﬁrst deﬁned as such by
Thompson (1980).
14 It refers to the difﬁculty to identify, even in principle, the
person responsible for some outcome, if a large number of people is involved in an
activity. But sometimes it is the joined acting of individuals within a collective that
bring about negative consequences, precisely because collectives can create
potentially greater harms than individuals working independently. Acting on an
individual basis, neither the water board nor the researchers could have built a
treatment plant with the innovative technology but as a collective they were able to
do so.
Some people therefore propose to hold the collective as a whole morally
responsible. All individuals within the collective are held equally responsible (May
and Hoffman 1991). This ascription of responsibility to the whole collective is
criticized for being morally unsatisfactory. People are then being held responsible
for the conduct of others, which is rendered unfair (Lewis 1991). This raises a
fundamental problem for individual responsibility: either no-one can be fairly held
responsible and hence the problem of many hands occurs, or moral responsibility is
ascribed to the whole collective of people who in some way contributed to the
outcome, leaving aside an individual assessment in terms of the responsibility
conditions, which is rendered unfair. The latter holds especially if sanctions are
coupled to the ascription of responsibility. After all, being part of a collective that
caused some negative event does not imply that one’s individual actions were
immoral or illegitimate and hence that one is eligible for blame.
15 We could also see
13 It should be emphasized that in reality the research team did further investigate the secondary
emissions and so the duty of care was adequately exercised.
14 Although the problem of many hands is mostly discussed in retrospective terms, it is strictly speaking
not limited to backward-looking responsibilities. One could also think of a situation where people need to
distribute a number of (sub)tasks to bring about a certain goal. In case this distribution of responsibilities
is not complete, for example because certain necessary (sub)tasks are overlooked, the problem of many
hands manifests itself as well.
15 Some philosophers have therefore introduced notions to distinguish between individuals who are
responsible for the conduct of the organization and individuals who are not. Kutz (2000) gives a
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unless it is fair to do so) and what we owe to potential victims (to make someone
responsible for preventing disasters). Although I think that individual responsibility
should not too easily be dismissed on the grounds that individuals are powerless
cogs in the machinery of their professional organization, the point remains that this
traditional individualistic approach seems to put much more emphasis on what we
owe to potential wrongdoers rather than on what we owe to potential victims.
16
Consequently, the problem of many hands is a serious threat to this approach.
This more conceptual problem of individual responsibility raises an important
practical problem as well. Due to the inability to ascribe moral responsibility, an
important opportunity for improvement is missed. Ascribing moral responsibility
may lead to learning processes, which may ultimately prevent similar disasters from
happening again in the future. If no-one can be held responsible, this opportunity for
learning will not be fully exploited (Nihle ´n Fahlquist 2006a).
Summarizing, in the merit-based perspective on responsibility it is difﬁcult to
ascribe responsibilities. In the light of engineering practice, this approach seems
rather powerless. In the extreme case, no-one learns from the mistakes being made
and the development of the technology continues as if nothing happened. As a
consequence, there is little incentive to take up the forward-looking responsibility to
prevent negative consequences.
A Rights-Based Perspective on Harm Caused by the GSBR Technology
As said in the section ‘‘Three Perspectives for Ascribing Responsibility,’’ the rights-
based perspective focuses on the task or obligation to set a situation right. With
regard to the question of liability, all people involved in the project (including the
end users) unanimously agreed that water boards using the new technology are
legally liable when incidents (such as problems related to the secondary emissions)
would occur.
If we apply the principle of strict liability, it is questionable whether institutions,
such as the water board in the present example, will ever participate in innovative
research projects. They will most probably be very reluctant in participating in the
development of innovative and radically new technologies. Some scholars even
argue that unrestricted liability would hamper any large-scale investment, also
desirable ones (Perrott 1982). After all, existing problems sometimes require radical
technological innovations (think of technological innovations relating to green
energy). Technologies are primarily developed to ‘‘change positively the quality of
life’’ (Berloznik and Van Langenhove 1998, p. 24), in the sense that they try to solve
Footnote 15 continued
minimalist criterion for individuals to be responsible for the group’s outcome. If individuals act on
overlapping participatory intentions, they can be said to be promoting a collective act and be responsible
for the outcome. Similarly, May (1992) argues that individuals are responsible for the organization’s
actions when they voluntarily joined the group.
16 Note that alternative ethical outlooks, notably a virtue ethics approach, may put more emphasis on
what we owe to potential victims, since these approaches depart from questions about the good life and
virtuous behavior rather than a rights-based or duty-based discourse (Ladd 1982).
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have to be made between competing values, in the GSBR case between
sustainability and safety. The categorical rejection of the technology because it
does not satisfy one of the demands is not a viable option, since this creates risks of
its own (Sunstein 2005).
As explained in the section ‘‘A Rights-Based Perspective on Responsibility: The
No Harm Principle,’’ the procedure of ‘‘informed consent’’ is introduced as a
possible response to this problem: in case of risk for irreversible harm the principle
of strict liability requires that consent of all people who are subjected to this risk be
obtained. If this consent cannot be obtained, the risk should simply not be posed
(Zandvoort 2008, p. 8). The fact that this approach takes seriously the perspective of
potential victims of (high-risk) technologies is unmistakably a strength. The risks of
these technologies cannot be imposed to anyone without his or her informed
consent. Hence, an unfair distribution of risks by majority decision making is not
allowed according to this approach. However, despite its democratic aim, this
approach runs the risk of paralyzing the debate on potentially risky technologies.
After all, the principle of actual consent implies that anyone has the right to veto
against activities that impose risks, which ultimately creates a society of stalemates
where nothing can be done, as Hansson argues (Hansson 2006, 2009). Informed
consent is problematic if applied to affected individuals collectively. Zandvoort
therefore discusses procedures to increase the willingness to consent (Zandvoort
2008). These are all based on monetary compensation (either directly or indirectly,
such as the building of a new city theatre if the city consents to the building of
nuclear plant in the neighborhood) or improvement of the credibility of risk
assessment. It is striking that both approaches do not give any incentive to improve
the technology itself. The focus is on ready-made technologies rather than
participation in decision making process along the way of development (Hansson
2006, p. 150).
Summarizing, the rights-based approach emphasizes the right of people to be
safeguarded from harm caused by others. However, the operationalization of this
right by way of the principle of informed consent is problematic in the context of
collective decision making. Moreover, the approach in itself seems problematic
because of its focus on monetary compensation instead of improvement of the
technology.
A Consequentialist Perspective on Potential Harm Caused by the GSBR
Technology
The third approach is the consequentialist perspective, which is in fact the approach
that was taken by the ethical parallel researchers. In the section ‘‘Ethical Parallel
Research Into The Upscaling Of The GSBR Technology,’’ I discussed how the
ethical parallel research inﬂuenced the development of the GSBR technology. The
ethical parallel research led to the identiﬁcation of gaps in the distribution of
responsibilities, in particular the responsibility for secondary emissions. As a result,
funds were acquired to carry out additional research into the secondary emissions.
As such the analysis of the responsibilities by the ethicists led to an improvement of
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its turn led to an improved technological design. The responsibilities were not
distributed on the basis of fairness criteria but on the basis of efﬁcacy (capacity,
power, resources). By making the technological research team aware of the
responsibility issues, some of the technological researchers took the initiative to
incorporate the secondary emissions in the research project. As such the effect of the
ethicists’ involvement on the engineering practice was not blaming or sanctioning
but rather that of co-shaping. The ethical parallel research did not so much pose
limits to the technology development but guided it.
Summarizing, since responsibilities are ascribed according to the criterion of
efﬁcacy, the problem of many hands does not manifest itself (or at least, not as
severely as would be the case in a strictly merit-based perspective). By taking a
consequentialist stance, the ethicists encouraged the engineers and researchers to
improve the technological design.
17
The Three Perspectives Compared
If we compare the different approaches all three have their merits. The merit-based
perspective emphasizes the fairness of a responsibility ascription. It takes seriously
the moral question: who, from a moral point of view, is responsible? This moral
notion of responsibility is in line with common morality, and especially in case of
victims of irreversible harm, people will be interested to hear the answer.
18 We
sometimes ‘‘want to ascribe responsibility to the person who is responsible—for
example, someone who intentionally and culpably brought about an unwanted
event—irrespective of the impact on future events of our responsibility ascriptions’’
(Nihle ´n Fahlquist 2006a, p. 17). The merit-based perspective does make a serious
attempt to try to answer this question of ‘‘who is responsible?’’ However, this
classical view on responsibility is based on an individualistic assessment of
responsibility, as we saw, which makes it problematic in the context of collective
action. Kutz argues that as long as individuals are only assessed in terms of the
actions they produce, the disparity between collective harm and individual effect
results in the disappearance of individual responsibility (Kutz 2000). And with the
disappearance of responsibility, so goes the incentive for individuals to improve
their behavior, he argues.
The question of ‘‘who is responsible?’’ was found to be less problematic in the
rights-based approach, since it uses only the causal condition rather than the full
range of responsibility conditions. With its focus on compensation and consent, this
approach put most emphasis on the interests of potential victims. However, it was
also shown that this approach gave no or only little incentive to actually improve
17 The encouragement to take up the forward-looking responsibility to improve technological design
seems in line with the virtue ethics aim of ‘‘responsible engineering.’’
18 Although the term ‘‘common morality’’ is a slippery term, most people agree that there are certain
values that most ‘‘thoughtful people implicitly use in arriving at moral judgments’’ (Gert 2004). I think
that the fairness of responsibility ascriptions is part of this shared system of morality, which is also
reﬂected in penal law.
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on the exploitation of innovative new technologies.
The consequentialist approach, as a third approach, appeared to be most powerful
in terms of the second point identiﬁed at the start of the paper: the ability to shape
the direction of technology development. It should be noted ﬁrst that engineers
themselves are often driven by a consequentialist heuristic of ‘‘problem solving’’
(Davis 2009). More than discussing who is to blame, they are guided by questions of
how to prevent the (re-)occurrence of harmful events. This attitude of ‘‘problem
solving’’ is necessarily context-speciﬁc. When engineers design a new technology
they want that technology to work under real-world circumstances and not only in a
laboratory. They therefore engage in extensive studies of errors and mistakes. As
Davis puts is,
Whatever is true of other professionals, engineers consider it their respon-
sibility to study any disaster that seems to arise from what they did – and to
report what they ﬁnd. To commit a certain mistake once, even a serious one, is
something engineers tolerate as part of advancing technology (…). What
engineers do not tolerate is that an engineer, any engineer, should make the
same mistake. Once a mistake has been identiﬁed, the state of the art advances
and what was once tolerable becomes intolerable (a kind of incompetence).
(…) Engineering is unusual among professions in recognizing an obligation to
‘acknowledge their errors’. (Davis 2009)
We could say that the consequentialist perspective is most typical of the engineering
practice itself. The background question is always ‘‘does it solve the problem at
hand?’’ By focusing on real issues rather than abstract duties or principles the
impact on engineering practice is also more sensitive to the context in which
technology development takes place.
19 If a certain responsibility ascription does not
lead to the desired solution to a real problem, this responsibility should not be
imposed or should be imposed differently. Compare this with the rights-based
perspective that focuses solely on the question whether or not readymade
technologies are harmful. The rights-based perspective seems to inﬂuence not so
much the direction but rather the pace of technology development.
Second, the consequentialist approach allows for more ﬁne-grained responsibility
ascriptions. Since the merit-based perspective is often applied after the fact
(i.e., after something undesirable has happened), the question of responsibility
becomes a matter of all-or-nothing: one is either responsible for the undesirable
outcome or not (Goodin 1985; Bovens 1998; Lynch and Kline 2000). Some
therefore argue that this merit-based perspective is about nonresponsibility: it
deﬁnes excusing conditions that exempt people from responsibility (Ladd 1989).
However, recent insights from Science and Technology Studies (STS) show that
before dramatic cases occur, often incremental small decisions have to be made that
19 It should be noted that this does not hold for consequentialism in general. A common critique of
consequentialism, as an ethical ideology, is that it is too narrowly focused on the promotion of one single
value. However, in the distribution of responsibilities within a particular practice, the consequentialist
perspective resonates the engineer’s heuristic of ‘problem solving’.
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sometimes catastrophic—events, engineering ethics should pay more attention to
the ‘‘complexities of engineering practice that shape decisions on a daily basis’’,
STS scholars argue (Lynch and Kline 2000), in order to modulate technology into
the desired direction (Bovens 1998; Swierstra and Jelsma 2006; Van de Poel and
Van Gorp 2006). The consequentialist responsibility ascription is based on the
capacity of each agent to contribute to the shaping of technology. After all, within
the consequentialist perspective, with its criterion of efﬁcacy, responsibilities ought
to be ascribed according to the capacity of each agent to discharge them. This is in
line with the common intuition that having the capacity, power, and resources to
contribute to the solution of a social problem, entails a forward-looking
responsibility to do so (Nihle ´n Fahlquist 2009). For example in case of risky
technologies, engineers, more than any stakeholder, have the knowledge of the risks
and possible ways to reduce them. From the consequentialist perspective this entails
the responsibility to address these risks. This responsibility ascription, then, is not
derived from a merit-based view in which particular actions are deemed faulty, but
rather from the set of obligations to see to it that a certain state of affairs is brought
about (i.e., a situation in which risks are prevented or at least addressed properly).
This approach to ascribing responsibility ﬁts nicely with the insights from more
sociologically oriented literature on the dynamics of engineering and technology
development.
However, efﬁcacious as it may be, the fairness of the responsibility ascription
cannot be ignored all together. This brings us to the other requirement of
appropriateness: the question whether or not the responsibility perspective reﬂects
people’s intuitions of when it is justiﬁed to ascribe a certain responsibility. It is
unlikely that a purely consequentialist approach is psychologically feasible. The
motivational force of responsibility ascriptions that are inconsistent with basic
intuitions of fairness will therefore be undermined (Kutz 2000, p. 129). This is in
line with the point made in the section about the relation between forward-looking
and backward-looking responsibility. The motivational force to take up one’s
forward-looking responsibility is partly derived from expressions of praise and
blame. The researcher in the GSBR project who judges his or her own
responsibility within the project as fair will be motivated to act according to it,
whereas the researcher that is assigned a responsibility unfairly will potentially be
inclined not to act according to it or to do it less carefully.
20 Moreover, from a
20 One could think of the simple task of writing the minutes of a meeting. If it is decided by majority rule
(but not consensus) that the same person should always make minutes of the meetings, this distribution of
responsibilities is efﬁcacious in the sense that for all meetings someone is ascribed the responsibility of
writing the minutes. However, after some time, this person might become less motivated to accurately
write down the minutes because he does not consider it fair that it is always him who should do the
writing. However, if the person realizes that it is fair that he is given this task and that he will be blamed
in case of sloppy minutes, he will most probably be motivated to come up with accurate minutes. More
related to technology development, one could think of the responsibility related to the social impact or
acceptance of the technology. If this is not recognized by the researchers as fairly being part of their work,
it is questionable whether it will be addressed adequately, even if someone is explicitly given the task to
look after the social impact.
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contravene our basic feelings of fairness. Even if fairness is not the overriding
criterion, we do not want a responsibility ascription that is morally unfair—both for
the victims and for the people who are potentially blamed. Hence, even though
fairness is not the ultimate criterion in the consequentialist perspective, it should
still somehow be taken into account. Especially in case different people are
involved there can be a tension between the requirement of efﬁcacy and that of
fairness. Whereas the fairness requirement is somewhat restrictive in ascribing
responsibility, the efﬁcacy requirement seems to have the opposite effect. It
broadens rather than narrows the scope of responsibility ascriptions. If we focus on
the fairness criterion, we probably end up with an ascription of responsibilities
which is undesirable from a consequentialist perspective. If we only stress the
efﬁcacy of the responsibility ascription, we probably end up with an unfair
distribution of responsibilities. Hence, we somehow have to incorporate both
perspectives if we ascribe responsibilities.
A possible way to reduce the tension between the requirements of fairness and
efﬁcacy, is to focus on alternative fairness criteria (i.e., criteria that are not related
to the traditional substantive fairness criteria for individual responsibility). Insights
from political philosophy show that fairness could also be achieved in a more
procedural way. According to a procedural approach to fairness, a responsibility
distribution can be rendered fair if it is established in a fair way (i.e., if it is the
result of a fair procedure). Further research is needed to explore this procedural
approach to fairness. A possible starting point may be the Rawlsian approach of
Wide Reﬂective Equilibrium (WRE), according to which a procedure can be
justiﬁed as fair if it ﬁts within the individual set of background theories and moral
principles of each relevant actor involved. The establishment of this procedural
fairness could be part of an embedded ethical research (Doorn forthcoming b; Van
de Poel and Zwart forthcoming). Questions as to which actors are relevant to
include and how to assess such a WRE need to be further explored (Doorn
forthcoming a).
The discussion above indicates an important role for the ethicist in the process of
distributing responsibilities and identifying potential (negative) side-effects and
consequences. The obvious question is then how this approach would work in case
the technical work is not paralleled by an ethicist. I think we have to make a
distinction between two situations. The ﬁrst is one where a group of researchers
have currently no embedded ethicists in their project but who have some experience
with ethical parallel research in previous projects. In this case the researchers have
experienced how ethical research could be carried out. It is a challenge to sustain
this ‘‘ethical attitude’’ in future projects. This is a challenge that somehow should be
considered already during the ethical parallel research itself. The future will tell to
what extent the impact of the past ethical parallel research will indeed lead to more
permanent ethical reﬂection by the engineers themselves during their work. It goes
without saying that the ethicists aspire that their involvement is not just a passing
phase and that they want an enduring impact on engineering practice. Further
research into the different methods for doing ethical parallel research and possible
ways to sustain its impact is therefore required.
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been paralleled by a team of ethicists. How to make sure that ethical reﬂection is
also incorporated in the work of these teams? Let me start by saying that there is a
positive trend in requirements by funding organizations. It is nowadays often
required to have a paragraph on ethical, legal, and social aspects (ELSA) in funding
proposals. Although this attention for ELSA still runs the risk of being nothing more
than ‘‘checkbox ethics,’’ it points to a direction of more awareness for the social
implications of technology. In addition to this requirement from funding organi-
zations, (prospective) engineers should be trained in recognizing moral issues
during their professional work. Engineering ethics should therefore be part of every
engineering curriculum. Whether this will make the role of the ethicists completely
replaceable is doubtful, but it will probably make engineers more prone to inviting
ethicists in their project if they need their advice.
Conclusions
In this paper I discussed three ‘‘responsibility perspectives’’ in the light of the
development of a new technology. It was found that the merit-based perspective was
rather powerless to the engineering practice because of the problem of many hands.
As a result, opportunities for learning and improvement were not optimally used.
The rights-based perspective appeared to be most pessimistic about technology
development. Due to its focus on monetary compensation, the effect of this
approach on technology development was rather restrictive. Funding organizations
and commercial partners would probably become reluctant to sponsoring innovative
research. Moreover, it did not provide a strong incentive to improve the technology
itself. The effect of the consequentialist perspective on engineering practice was
most profound. This approach allowed for more ﬁne-grained responsibility
ascriptions and was found to ﬁt nicely with insights from STS literature.
Although the consequentialist approach was found most powerful in co-shaping
the direction of technology development, it was argued that the fairness requirement
could not be ignored all together. It was shown that, for both moral and a
consequentialist reasons, responsibility ascription should reﬂect our basic intuitions
of when a particular responsibility ascription is justiﬁed. Since there is a potential
tension between the traditional fairness criteria and the criterion of efﬁcacy, it was
proposed to conceive of fairness in a more procedural rather than substantive way,
in order to reconcile the two demands of responsibility ascriptions.
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